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Mountain States Legal Foundation v.
Glickman: Disputes Over Timber Removal
From National Forests
ELIZABETH MONOHAN" AND BRIAN WRIGHT **
INTRODUCTION
In Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Glickman,' the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit dealt with
the issue of whether several interest groups could successfully challenge
a United States Forest Service decision regarding timber harvesting in
a national forest. The court of appeals reviewed a dismissal by the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia of a suit
brought under the National Environmental Policy Act,2 the Administra-
tive Procedure Act,3 the Endangered Species Act,' and several federal
statutes dealing with national forest administration.5 Plaintiffs sought
to prevent the implementation of a timber harvesting plan in a national
forest.6 The court discussed the plaintiffs' procedural claims and also
their substantive theories.7 The court of appeals affirmed the district
court's dismissal of the claims, but held that the plaintiffs did have
standing.' The claims failed on the merits rather than on a lack of
standing.' The court of appeals applied the zone-of-interests test to the
* Staff Member, JOURNAL OF NATURAL REsouRcEs & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, J.D., Class of
1998, University of Kentucky; B.A. 1995, Centre College of Kentucky.
- Staff Member, JOURNAL OF NATURAL RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, J.D., Class of
1998, University of Kentucky; B.S. 1995, Centre College of Kentucky.
I Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1994).
' 5 U.S.C. § 551-559-701-6, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (1994).
4 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 and scattered sections of 7 and 16 U.S.C. (1994).
' Mountain States Legal Found, 92 F.3d at 1231-32. The other federal statutes invoked
were 16 U.S.C.§§ 473-82, 551; (1994); the Multiple-Use Sustained Act (MUSYA), 16 U.S.C. §§
528-31 (1994); The National Forest Management Act (NFMA), codified at scattered sections of
16 U.S.C.
6 Mountain States Legal Found., 92 F.3d at 1231.
Id. at 1232.
S Id. at 1231.
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plaintiffs' claims and determined that the claims fell within the zone of
interests to be protected by the statutes. '0
The doctrine of standing limits judicial authority." The issue of
standing in a case is independent of the merits, and asks "whether the
litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or
of particular issues."' 2 Article III of the United States Constitution
requires that courts are limited to hearing only "cases or
controversies". 3 The federal courts have long been concerned about the
role of courts in American society, and have defined standing as one
way to limit that role.' 4 The Supreme Court has defined the Article III
requirements for standing, 5 and has also developed prudential limita-
tions on standing.'6
The zone-of-interests test serves as one such prudential limitation
on standing. 7 In order to have standing, a plaintiff's claims must fall
"arguably within the zone-of-interests to be protected or regulated" by
the statute.II The Court adopted this test for standing to balance two
competing interests:'9 the trend toward enlarging the class of people
who may challenge administrative action,°and the potential for courts
to be disrupted by the inundation of litigation from such challenges.2
The Supreme Court has not clarified whether the zone-of-interests test
applies to cases outside of the Administrative Procedure Act22 context.
In an effort to broaden the class of people who may sue, Congress
has enacted citizen suit provisions in a number of environmental
o Id. at 1235-38.
See Lisa M. Bromberg, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Where Does the Standing Issue
Stand in Environmental Litigation?, 16 AM. J. TRIAL ADvOC. 761(1993).
12 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
" U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
14 Warth, 422 U.S. at 498.
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984).
Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1972).
17 Id. See also Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 394-403 (1987).
11 Camp, 397 U.S. at 153.
19 Clarke, 479 U.S. at 397.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) has a provision for a right of review: "A person
suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency




statutes,2 3 including the Endangered Species Act.24 By granting broad
standing, Congress intended to promote citizen enforcement of
environmental laws.25 The ESA states that "any person" can bring a suit
under the Act.'6 The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress has
the power to broaden the scope of standing as long as the minimum
constitutional standing requirements are satisfied.27
The MUSYA states that it is the policy of Congress that "the
national forests are established and shall be administered for outdoor
recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes."2s
Many opposing interests compete for the use of the national forests and
the resources found in the forests. A typical situation has recently
developed in Kentucky regarding the Daniel Boone National Forest and
the issue of timber removal from the forest. The forest service is
considering continuing to allow logging while public interest groups,
concerned with endangered species and recreation and aesthetic
problems, are seeking to reduce or eliminate timber harvesting.29
This Comment will focus on the D.C. Circuit's two-part analysis in
Mountain States Legal Foundation. First, this Comment will analyze
the standing controversy, focusing on the history of prudential standing
in United States Supreme Court cases and describing the disagreement
among the federal judicial circuits in applying the zone-of-interest test
to claims brought pursuant to the ESA. That will be followed by an
analysis of Mountain States Legal Foundation. The Comment will
discuss the impropriety of applying any prudential standards to suits
2 See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972 (1994).
24 16 U.S.c. § 1540(g) (1994) (ESA).
15 See H. REP. No. 93-412, at 18-19 (1973).
26 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1994). The relevant sections of the ESA state:
(1)... any person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf-
(A) to enjoin any person, including the United States and any other
governmental instrumentality or agency (to the extent permitted by the
eleventh amendment to the Constitution), who is alleged to be in violation
of any provision of this chapter or regulation issued under the authority
thereof; or
(C) against the Secretary where there is alleged a failure of the
Secretary to perform any act or duty under section 1533 of this title which
is not discretionary with the Secretary.
27 See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,501(1975).
28 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1994).
29 The Associated Press, Forest Plan Up For Comment, THE C1NCINNATI ENQuiRER, July 14,
1996, at BI.
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brought under the ESA as well as the necessity of allowing a plaintiff
with economic interests to bring suit under the ESA.
Next, this Comment will analyze the court's ruling on the merits,
and explain the effects of such issues, specifically on timber harvesting
in the Daniel Boone National Forest in Kentucky. This Comment will
discuss the necessity of the courts to consider all interests affected by
Forest Service decisions relating to the use of national forests.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The United States Supreme Court
Article III of the United States Constitution limits what courts can
hear to "cases and controversies."" The United States Supreme Court
has articulated a three-part test to be met in order to have the constitu-
tional minimum for standing.3 First, a plaintiff must have suffered
from an injury in fact that is concrete and particularized, as well as
actual and imminent.32 Second, a causal connection must exist between
the injury and the conduct challenged.33 Third, the relief sought must
likely be able to redress the injury.
34
In addition to the "irreducible constitutional minimum" of standing,
the Supreme Court has also imposed prudential standing requirements;
however, the doctrine of prudential standing is difficult to precisely
define.35 In Warth v. Seldin, the Court described prudential consider-
ations of standing as limitations imposed by a court concerned with "the
proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic
society. '36 Prudential standing consists of judicially self-imposed
limitations that are necessary to avoid judicial decisions regarding
significant abstract questions best left to other branches of
government.37 Prudential standing involves more limitations than
constitutional standing. While all cases must meet the constitutional
requirements, Congress may eliminate the imposition of prudential
30 U.S. CONST. art. IIl, § 2, cl. 1.
" See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (citing Allen v. Wright,




3 Bromberg, supra note 11, at 764.
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,498 (1975).




The Supreme Court introduced one prudential requirement, the
"zone-of-interests test", in Association of Data Processing Service
Organizations v. Camp.9 A plaintiffs injury must fall "arguably within
the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or
constitutional guarantee in question."4° But the Court recognized that
Congress can resolve the question of standing by explicitly allowing
broader standing requirements, "save as the requirements of Article III
dictate otherwise."'4
The Supreme Court reaffirmed and redefined the zone-of-interests
test in Clarke v. Securities Industries Ass 'n.42 The Court interpreted the
test to ask "whether in view of Congress' evident intent to make agency
action presumptively reviewable, a particular plaintiff should be heard
to complain of a particular agency decision."'43 Clarke broadened the
test by stating that a court does not need to find explicit congressional
intent to "benefit would-be plaintiffs." But Clarke also limited the
situations in which a court should apply the test. Courts should not
universally apply the zone-of-interests test, although the Supreme Court
did not clarify when to apply the test outside of the APA.45
When faced with environmental issues, the Supreme Court has
applied prudential standing limitations when actions involving the
NEPA are challenged under the APA's right of review.' The Court has
not applied the zone-of-interests tests to challenges brought under the
3 Id. at 501.
39 397 U.S. 150(1970).
' Id. at 153. The plaintiffs in Camp challenged a Comptroller's ruling that national banks
could make data processing services available to other banks and to banks' customers, invoking
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994), the Bank Service Corporation Act, 12
U.S.C. § 1864 (1994), and the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1994). Id. at 155-57.
41 Camp, 397 U.S. at 154.
42 479 U.S. 388 (1987). (The plaintiffs in Clarke invoked the APA and the National Bank
Act. Id. at 388-89.).
I' ld. at 399. The Court also stated:
Where the plaintiff is not itself the subject of the contested regulatory
action, the test denies a right of review if the plaintiff's interests are so
marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the
statute that it cannot reasonably be presumed that Congress intended to
permit the suit.
Id.
4 Id. at 399-400.
4sId. at 400n.16.
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 737 (1972); United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 686 (1973); Lujan v. National Wildlife
Fed., 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
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ESA. Instead, the Court focuses on the injury-in-fact requirement of the
constitutional minimum. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife47 (Defenders
III), the Supreme Court considered a challenge to a regulation of the
Secretary of the Interior brought under the citizen suit provision of the
ESA.4 8 Justice Scalia, writing the majority opinion, focused the entire
analysis on the constitutional requirements for standing. He determined
that the plaintiff did not have standing since it failed to show an injury-
in-fact necessary for Article III standing.49 Although the Court did not
expressly define the bounds for standing conferred by the ESA, the
focus on the constitutional minimum implies that "had the plaintiffs
cleared Article III hurdles, they would have had standing under the ESA
without further analysis."50
B. Division Among the Circuit Courts
The circuit courts are divided on the issue of whether to apply the
zone-of-interests test to suits brought under the citizen suit provision of
the ESA. Mountain States Legal Foundation has created another circuit
split on the related issue of whether a plaintiff with purely economic
interests can fall within the zone of interests of the ESA.
The Eighth Circuit did not apply the zone-of-interests tests to
environmental statutes in which Congress included citizen suit provi-
sions."' In Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel (Defenders I), the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected the application of the zone-of-
interests test to ESA citizen suits by recognizing that "Congress may
eliminate the prudential limitations by legislation."" Defenders I
involved several private environmental groups who challenged a
Department of the Interior regulation that allowed U.S. agencies to fund
overseas projects without consultation on the impact on endangered
" 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
48 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1994). The plaintiffs in Defenders lllchallenged a change in the
administration of the ESA, which required other agencies to confer with the Secretary of the
Interior under the ESA with respect to projects funded by the federal government in the United
States and on the high seas only, where as before conference was required for projects in foreign
countries also. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 556 (1992) (Defenders II).
41 Defenders 111, 504 U.S. at 556.
50 Jeffery W. Ring & Andrew F. Behrend, Using PlainaffMotivation to Limit Standing: An
Inappropriate Attempt to Short-Circuit Environmental Citizen Suits, 8 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 345,
352 (1994).
" Defenders ofWildlife v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1035 (8th Cir. 1988), rev'don other grounds,
504 U.S. 555 (1992).
": Defenders, 851 F.2dat 1039.
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species. 3 The court held that plaintiffs did not need to meet any
prudential standing requirements. Since the ESA "provides that 'any
person' may commence a suit to enjoin any person who is alleged to be
in violation of the ESA .... Plaintiffs therefore need meet only the
constitutional requirements for standing for their claims under the
ESA. 1114
Conversely, the Ninth Circuit applied the prudential standing test
to the ESA, overriding the citizen suit provision.55 In Bennett v. Plenert,
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the zone-of-interests
test applies to the ESA, "notwithstanding the broad language of the
citizen suit provision." 6 The court of appeals applied this prudential
standing requirement because their court and other courts regularly
applied the test, despite Congress' enactment of legislation which
expands the class of those who can bring suit.57 The court also applied
the test narrowly.5" Bennett v. Plenert held that, to fall within the zone
of interests protected by the ESA, a plaintiff must have a purpose of
preserving endangered species.59 Those who have purely economic
interests do not meet the test because their interests are not protected by
the ESA.'
The D.C. Circuit applied the zone-of-interests test, but failed to
address whether the test overrides the ESA's citizen suit provision.61 In
Mountain States Legal Foundation, the District of Columbia Circuit did
not address whether the citizen suit provision of the ESA eliminates all
prudential standing requirements, because the plaintiffs did not raise the
issue.6 2 However, the D.C. Circuit applied the test less narrowly than
the Ninth Circuit by allowing economic interests to fall within the zone-
53 Id. at 1036.
5 d. at 1039.
"s Bennett v. Plenert, 63 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S.Ct. 1316 (1996).
36 Id. at 918. Bennett v. Plenert involved two ranch operators and two irrigation districts
who brought a suit against the United States challenging its biological opinion, and who asserted
standing based on commercial and recreational purposes. Id. at 916.
SId. at 918.
I d. at 921.
59 Id.
' Id. at 921-22. Bennett v. Plenert does not address whether the plaintiffs assert an interest
that falls within the zone of interests to be regulated by the ESA. Association of Data Processing
Serv. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (definition of the zone-of-interests tests involves interests to "be
protected or regulated" by the statute). id.
" Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228,1236 (D.C. Circuit 1996); State
of Idaho v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 35 F.3d 585, 590 (1994).
2 Mountain States Legal Found., 92 F.3d at 1237.
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of-interests.63
C. Kentucky Federal Courts
Kentucky Federal Courts have not ruled on timber harvesting issues
brought pursuant to the Endangered Species Act. However, the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, in Kentucky
Heartwood, Inc. v. United States Forest Service,' ruled on a challenge
made to timber harvesting in Daniel Boone National Forest brought
under a different statute. The statute involved in that case was the
Emergency Salvage Timber Sale Program.6' The plaintiffs in Kentucky
Heartwood were environmental groups seeking to enjoin all harvesting
of timber in the Daniel Boone National Forest in order to protect the
endangered Indiana bat found there.' Salvage timber sales, are "not
subject to any federal environmental or natural resources laws,"
'67
making it more difficult to successfully challenge any governmental
action dealing with the sale of salvage timber from national forests. As
a result, the plaintiffs' claims were dismissed by the court. Kentucky
courts have taken no further action pertaining to timber harvesting in
national forests.
III. MOUNTAIN STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION v. GLiCKMAN
A. Facts and Procedural History
In Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Glickman, plaintiffs were
two non-profit corporations, several Montana and Idaho municipalities,
and a lumber company who brought suit against the United States
government, attacking the government's choice among several
alternatives available for timber harvesting in a national forest.6 In
63 Id.
Kentucky Heartwood, Inc. v. United States Forest Serv., 906 F.Supp. 410 (E.D. Ky. 1995).
" Emergency Salvage Timber Sale Program, 16 U.S.C. § 1611 (1996). "Salvage timber
sales" refer to sales of storm-damaged timber in national forests as well as other dead or decaying
trees. This timber has little or no use in the forest, and can even pose dangers to people and wildlife
in the forest. Accordingly, the U.S. Forest Service is given more discretion in authorizing the
harvesting of salvage timber. See Michael Axline, Salvage Logging: Point & Counterpoint, 26
ENVTL. L. 613 (Summer 1996).
' Kentucky Heartwood, Inc. 906 F.Supp. at 411.
63 Id. at412.
6 Mountain States Legal Found. v Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
(VOL. 12:189
TIMBER REMOVAL
1972, the Forest Service discovered that the mountain pine beetle was
killing pine trees in the Upper Yaak River Drainage Region of the
Kootenai National Forest in Montana.69 The dead trees greatly
increased the threat of wildfire in the region and also "rapidly lose their
commercial value," 70 so the Forest Service wanted to increase timber
harvesting.7' The construction of logging roads and an increase in
logging operations required an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
pursuant to the NEPA and the ESA.71 The EIS, completed in 1990,
considered environmental, economic, and social impacts in fourteen
alternative plans with "varying levels of timber harvest and road
construction". 73 The Forest Supervisor of the Kootenai National Forest
chose an alternative that allowed considerably more logging than the
one which the EIS suggested. 74 The plaintiffs brought suit in district
court, challenging the decision, because they wanted the Forest Service
to allow even more logging by choosing a different alternative.75
Plaintiffs invoked the APA, NEPA, ESA, MUSYA, NFMA, and what
the court referred to as the Organic Act.76 The district court held that
plaintiffs lacked standing on most claims, and dismissed the others for
lack of standing, and in the alternative, on the merits.7
B. Narrative Analysis
In Mountain States Legal Foundation, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia first considered whether the
plaintiffs had both constitutional and prudential standing.7" Determining





73 Mountain States Legal Found., 92 F.3d at 1231.
74 Id.
"' Id. The Forest Supervisor chose Alternative 9B, which projected sales of 90 million board
feet of lumber. The plaintiffs prefer Alternative 6, which projects lumber sales of 151 million board
feet. The EIS has preferred Alternative 9A, which allowed for the least logging among the three
alternatives at issue. The Forest Supervisor did not chose the EIS's preferred alternative because
9A would "provide the highest timber harvest level while meeting the requirements of the ESA."
Id. (Quoting Record of the Decision at 2 (August 24, 1990)).
76 Id., 92 F.3d at 1231. For a discussion on the APA, NEPA, ESA, MUSYA and NFMA,
see infra notes 22-6 and accompanying text.
17 See Mountain States Legal Found. v. Madigan, No. CIV.A. 92-0097, 1992 WL 613292
(D.D.C. 1992); Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman, 922 F.Supp. 628 (D.D.C. 1995).
" Mountain States Legal Found., 92 F.3d at 1232-38.
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claims and found that they failed.7 9
The court noted that when one plaintiff satisfies all standing
requirements the court need not consider the other plaintiffs."0 The
court first analyzed whether any of the plaintiffs satisfied constitutional
standing.8 The constitutional minimum for standing requires an injury
in fact, a causal connection between the injury and the challenged
conduct, and likelihood of redressability.8 2 The Court recognized two
independent ways in which plaintiffs met these requirements. 3 First,
the injury to economic interests of the logging company from curtail-
ment of the logging was sufficient to meet the requirements. The EIS
injured the logging company by forcing a temporary closure of the
plaintiff lumber company's mill in which twenty-five workers were laid
off.' Second, the Forest Service's decision also damaged the aesthetic
and environmental interests of the plaintiffs who lived in the region
through an increase in the risk of wildfire.8" Specifically, the plaintiffs
claimed that the remaining trees, found in lodgepole pine stands,
contribute to rapid buildup of fuel,86 and would pose "an unnecessarily
high risk of catastrophic wildfire, endangering the grizzly bear, the
forest itself, and people living nearby."87
Next, the court focused on prudential standing by applying the
zone-of-interests test to all claims.88 The court pointed out that only
those injuries which meet the constitutional standing requirements can
be analyzed under the zone-of-interests test. 9 A purely economic
interest is not one of the many interests to be served by NEPA. 90 But
19 Id. at 1238.
80 Id. at 1232.
I id. at 1232.
82 For a discussion of the constitutional requirements for standing, see infra notes 11-27 and
accompanying text.
" Mountain States Legal Found., 92 F.3d at 1232.
84 Id.
" Id. at 1232-35.
86 Id. at 1234.
7 Id. at 1232.
8 Id. at 1235.
8, Mountain States Legal Found., 92 F. 3d at 1232.
'0 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331. The relevant sections state:
The purposes of this chapter are: To declare a national policy which will
encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his
environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage
to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare
of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and
natural resources important to the Nation ....
(VOL. 12:189
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plaintiffs who use the region for aesthetic and environmental purposes
such as hiking, camping, and fishing have interests that are protected in
the NEPA, and those interests are sufficiently threatened by the
increased risk of wildfire." The forest management statutes clearly
express Congress' intent "that the national forests should play a
significant role in supplying timber"92 and also to promote outdoor
recreation in these areas.93 Plaintiffs' interests and their injuries fell
within these two statutory purposes, so their claims under the forest
management statutes, as well as the NEPA, satisfied prudential
standing.94
The plaintiffs made two claims under the ESA that seem to be at
odds. 95 They first claimed that the heightened risk of wildfires caused
by the government's action would threaten the grizzly bear and its
habitat. % The second claim advanced interests that did not consider the
protection of the grizzly bear and may even harm the animal.97 The
plaintiffs asserted that a critical habitat designation and the protections
that ensue under such a designation should occur only after consider-
ation of the economic impact of such action, which the government
failed to consider.9 The court dismissed the grizzly bear threat claim,
stating that although protecting the grizzly bear is within the zone of
interests the statute sought to protect, the plaintiffs did not really have
an interest in such protection." Plaintiffs' concern with the economic
benefits of logging suggested little concern for the grizzly bear habitat.
The main purpose of the ESA is to protect the habitat of those
endangered species. The court recognized that economic interests can
also fall within the zone of interests of the ESA. Congress did not
42 U.S.C. § 4321. See also Realty Income Trust v. Eckard, 564 F.2d 447, 452 (1977).
9 Mountain States Legal Found., 92 F.3d at 1236. Plaintiffs can have economic interests
and still have NEPA standing as long as they assert interests that do qualify under the zone-of-





" Id. at 1236.
Id. at 1236-37.
7 Mountain States Legal Found., 92 F.3d at 1237.
98 Id. at 1236-37.
Id. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) states that:
The Secretary shall designate critical habitat... on the basis of the
best scientific data available and after taking into consideration the
economic impact, and any other relevant impact, of specifying any
particular area as critical habitat.
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intend for governmental agency action to lack any constraints, which
lawsuits brought by those with economic interests could provide.' °°
This lack of constraint can happen when the government agency is
seeking to regulate public lands if a party with economic interests is not
allowed to bring suit.'0 '
The court then ruled on the merits. It found that the Forest Service
did not disregard necessary procedures, nor did it act arbitrarily and
capriciously when it selected the alternative that permitted less logging
than the alternative the plaintiffs championed. 102 The court gave great
deference to the Forest Supervisor, who stated that he chose Alternative
9A because it permitted the most logging while still protecting the
grizzly bear as required by the ESA. 13 The statutes involved did not
override the discretion of the Forest Service. For example, while one
goal of the MUSYA is to promote timber harvesting,'" the court held
that it did not guarantee that resources be put to a combination of uses
which is the most economically beneficial. 0
The court also held that the plaintiffs had misinterpreted the ESA.0 6
The plaintiffs asserted that the decision of the Forest Service to
implement Alternative 9A depended entirely on the area of the National
Forest in question being designated a critical habitat, as required by the
ESA. In fact, the court found that the decision of the Forest Supervisor
was based merely on what plan would "jeopardize the grizzly bear,"
regardless of whether it was in an area designated as a critical habitat.0 7
The court held this to be a valid argument on the part of the Forest
Supervisor.
With regard to the claims of the plaintiffs under the NEPA, the
court also found for the defendants. The plaintiffs' first argument was
based on an alleged failure of the government to prepare an environ-
mental impact statement for a grizzly bear recovery plan. The court
dismissed these claims because the plaintiffs never identified such a
plan, nor did they show "what role it may have played in the framing of
the Biological Opinion or any other agency decision."'' 0 Second, under
"o Mountain States Legal Found., 92 F.3d at 1237.
1i Id.
102 Id. at 1238-39.
101 Id. at 1238.
'04 See 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1996).
" Mountain States Legal Found., 92 F.3d at 1238.
"o6 Id. at 1238-39.
107 Id.
01 ld. at 1239.
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NEPA, the plaintiffs claimed that the government used water quality as
the "only real factor" in selecting Alternative 9A. 1 The court held that
this claim was clearly false, as the Forest Supervisor based his decision
on a "concern for the grizzly bear" and on a "desire to follow the
ESA."',10
IV. CRmCAL ANALYSIS OF STANDING ISSUES
Although the District of Columbia Circuit properly concluded that
the plaintiffs had standing to bring their claims, the court of appeals
improperly applied the zone-of-interests test to the claims brought under
the ESA."' Any prudential requirements limiting suits invoking the
ESA contravene the intent of Congress to broaden standing.' A court
should not consider whether the plaintiff asserts that the citizen suit
provision eliminates the prudential limits to standing. By claiming that
application is not universal, Clarke indicated that a court should not
apply the zone-of-interests test outside of the APA context." 3
In Warth v. Seldin, the Supreme Court recognized the power of
Congress to confer standing." Congress may "grant an express right
of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by prudential
standing.""' 5 In the ESA, Congress did grant an express right to "any
person" to commence a civil suit "to enjoin any person, including the
United States, who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this
chapter." 611 For a court to disregard this provision and limit standing
more than the constitutional minimum requires would upset the
separation of powers of the branches of government.""
The D.C. Circuit applied the zone-of-interests test to the ESA
without discussing the citizen suit provision." 8 The court in Mountain
States Legal Foundation relied on State ofIdaho v. Interstate Commerce
109 Id.
1o Mountain States Legal Found., 92 F.3d at 1239.
Sheldon K. Rennie, Bennett v. Plenert: Using the Zone-Of-Interests Test to Limit Standing
Under the Endangered Species Act, 7 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 375, 394-95 (1996).
1 Ring & Behrend, supra note 50, at 348.
"a Clarke v. See. Indus. Ass'n.,, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987).
114 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
t"' Id.
16 16U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A) (1994).
117 Rennie, supranote 111, at398.
18 Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d at 1228, 1236 (citing State of Idaho
v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 35 F.3d 585, 592 (D.C.Cir. 1994)).
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Commission' to apply the zone of interests test. Idaho involved a state
government and three mining companies who challenged actions of the
Interstate Commerce Commission regarding abandonment of certain
railroad tracks. 2° The plaintiffs invoked the ESA, among other federal
statutes.' 2' The court in Idaho applied the zone-of-interests test to
determine whether the state had standing to sue under the ESA. 22 The
court recognized that the citizen suit provision conferred authority to
sue.' But that provision only brought the state within the ESA's zone
of interests when the provision was coupled with a property interest that
the state had in the land surrounding the abandoned railway line. 124 The
court did not address the question whether the citizen suit provision
overrides the zone-of-interest test.
Both Idaho and Mountain States Legal Foundation incorrectly
apply the zone-of-interests test in the ESA context. Congress conferred
standing to the broadest range of would-be plaintiffs permissible, only
limited by the Article III requirement and the specific limitations placed
in the statute. 2 The Supreme Court has stated that Congress may
confer standing to the extent allowed by the U.S. Constitution. 26 The
Eighth Circuit correctly held that plaintiffs need "meet only the
constitutional requirements for standing for their claims under the
ESA."1
2 7
Mountain States Legal Foundation creates another division among
circuits on the issue of whether a would-be plaintiff claiming injury to
an economic interest under the ESA meets the prudential standing
requirements under the zone-of-interests test. 2 ' In Bennett v. Plenert,
the Ninth Circuit held that economic interests are contrary to the
purpose of the ESA, and therefore, any plaintiff asserting economic
injury does not fall within the zone of interests to be protected by the
ESA. 29 The District of Columbia in Mountain States Legal Foundation
" Idaho, 35 F.3d. 585 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Mountain States Legal Found, 92 F.3d at 1236.
120 Idaho, 35 F.3d at 588.
121 Id.
22 Id. at 592.
'1 Id. at 592.
124 Id.
121 The ESA's citizen suit provision applies to any person, as long as that person follows
certain guidelines. The person must notify the Secretary of the Interior of the violation and wait
sixty days before commencing suit. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(2)(A) (1994).
126 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
27 Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1035, 1039 (8th Cir. 1988).
'2 Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
29 See Bennett v. Plenert, 63 F.3d 915, 921-22 (9th Cir. 1995).
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recognized that "[w]hile Congress clearly did not adopt the ESA for the
purpose of protecting economic interests, it equally clearly intended that
such interests should come into play when critical habitats are
designated."' 130 The D.C. Circuit held that plaintiff lumber company,
asserting an economic interest under the ESA, had "no obstacle to
prudential standing."13'
Assuming that the zone-of-interest test would apply to claims
brought under the ESA,' the D.C. Circuit applied the test correctly to
those asserting economic interests. Conversely, the Ninth Circuit
incorrectly interpreted Clarke as barring all who do not "allege an
interest in the preservation of endangered species."' Congress
amended the ESA in 1978 to incorporate economic interests by
including language that requires the weighing of the economic impact
of any critical habitat designation.'34 Clarke states that the zone-of-
interests test involves Congress' intent.' By including language that
obligates the regulator to consider economic factors in designating a
critical habitat, Congress demonstrated an intention to encompass
economic interests within the ESA. 3
By conferring standing under the ESA to only those plaintiffs
whose main interest is preserving endangered species, a court is
applying another prudential limitation, one that considers the motives
of the plaintiff and determines whether those motives are appropriate to
allow the plaintiff to proceed with the suit.' Several policy issues
"' Mountain States Legal Found., 92 F.3d at 1237.
131 Id
13 The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Bennett v. Plenert. 116 $.Ct. 1316. The issues
on appeal, according to petitioner's brief arc:
I. Whether the broad standing mandated by Congress in the citizen suit
provision of the Endangered Species Act is subject to the zone of
interests test as a further, judicially imposed, prudential limitation on
standing;
2. If standing to sue under the Endangered Species Act is subject to
prudential limitations, whether those limitations permit only environ-
mental plaintiffs to challenge government conduct alleged to violate the
terms of the Act or whether claims of economic injury raised by public
water suppliers and water users are also within the zone of interests
protected or regulated by the Act.
Brief for Petitioners at I, Bennett v. Plenert, No. 95-813, 1996 WL 2777131.
' Plenern, 63 F.3dat918.
'34 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (1994).
'3 Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass'n., 479 U.S. 388, 399 1987).
' H.R. 14104, 95th Cong. (1978).
13' Ring & Behrend, supra note 50, at 346.
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argue against a motivational test for standing in the ESA context.'
More standing limitations create more obstacles in an "already complex
maze which discourages parties from raising meritorious claims."'
Also, a motivational test makes the doctrine of standing a subjective
issue, which can lead to arbitrary results. 40 Another policy consider-
ation is that a motivational approach to standing will result in skewed
regulatory approaches by the government.' 4 ' Governmental agencies
may disregard certain important interests, because only some injured
parties may be able to successfully challenge the regulations.
42
The D.C. Circuit appears to be concerned with the last policy issue:
whether the government had disregarded important interests. As
Mountain States Legal Foundation states, the statute as applied governs
the use of public property, and therefore "the 'regulated' entity and the
decision making agency are one and the same.' 43 If a plaintiff cannot
assert a claim under the ESA in this situation because it has an eco-
nomic injury, then no one would be able to challenge the governmental
action in the courts.'" Congress did not intend for this to happen and
expressly provided a broad citizen suit provision so that agency actions
could be challenged.'" Mountain States Legal Foundation correctly
held that "as plaintiffs have shown an eminently plausible relationship
between their interests and policy values that play an important
constraining role in the statutes at issue, and thus must be said to
underlie those statutes, we see no obstacle to prudential standing."'"
V. IMPACT ON TIMBER HARVESTING IN NATIONAL FORESTS
Mountain States Legal Foundation dealt with issues that are
important to people and groups concerned with national forest regula-
tions throughout the country. Our national forests provide resources for
many groups with different competing interests, such as hikers,
campers, loggers, environmentalists, and those who live nearby. When
these interests clash over the use of the forests' resources, courts need











some framework for determining the appropriate uses for these
resources. Not only must the courts make rulings on who can sue in
court, but the court must then review decisions made by various
agencies relating to the national forests. As in Mountain States Legal
Foundation, courts give great deference to the decisions of the Forest
Service about the uses of national forests.'47 But the courts are often the
only available method of redress for some interest groups, and the
courts should provide an opportunity for those groups to challenge
Forest Service decisions.
With the recent debates over the amount of timber removal in the
Daniel Boone National Forest, 41 Kentucky courts are likely to encoun-
ter many of the same questions that faced the court in Mountain States
Legal Foundation. The first decision of the court will be whether
particular plaintiffs should be allowed to sue.1 9 Once the standing issue
is resolved, the court will then look at the decision made by the Forest
Service. In reviewing these decisions, the court must look to the various
competing interests and determine if the agency acted in an arbitrary
and capricious manner and if the agency followed necessary procedures
in making the decision."'
In Kentucky, some of the people seeking to file suit may desire the
Forest Service to allow more timber harvesting. One reason for this
might be to remove unwanted resources 5' from the national forest.
Another reason might be to reduce the probabilities of wildfires in the
forest, which might result from more incendiary timber remaining in the
forest.'52 Others might desire more timber harvesting to support their
economic interests. Included in this group would be lumber companies
who derive much of their business from timber harvested from national
forests, as well as the people who live in communities which depend on
", id. at 1238-39.
s See, e.g., Andy Mead, Suit Opposes Logging in Forest Near Red River Gorge, THE
LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Saturday, Oct. 12, 1996, at Al; Anne Chen, Public Input Sought on
Daniel Boone Forest's Future, THE CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, July 20, 1996, at B 1; Allen G. Reed,
Forest to Lift Logging Ban Imposed to Save Rare Bird, THE LOUISVILLE COURIER-JOURNAL; May
20, 1995, at 7A.
49 See discussion, supra, pp. 8-16.
ISO Mountain States Legal Found., 92 F.3d at 1231.
"' For example, dead trees or trees in areas that are better suited for clearings-such as areas
that would be suitable for recreational facilities or areas that would better serve the feeding habits
of animals if they were cleared and covered in grass.
52 For example, the lodgepole pine stands in the Kootenai National Forest posed a great risk
of wildfire. See Mountain States Legal Found., 92 F. 3d at 1231 (noting how...).
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these same lumber companies.'53 The timber industry in Kentucky is
extensive. In one four-county area in south-central Kentucky,'54 there
exist over 100 sawmills.'55 While only a small percentage of these
businesses may depend on timber from national forests for their
livelihood, many sawmills and lumber companies are located near
national forests, and depend on that timber.
5 6
At the same time, many people might desire that the amount of
timber harvested from national forests be curtailed. The reasons for
desiring less timber harvesting in national forests abound. Some of
these reasons might include reducing damage done to the forests and to
wildlife through timber removal. '57 Many people also would argue that
excessive logging in the national forests detracts from the overall
aesthetic beauty of the national forests.
In deciding on the merits of these cases, the courts should ensure
that decisions made by the governmental agencies with respect to timber
sales in national forests do not violate any applicable statutes, specifi-
cally the APA, the ESA, the NEPA, the MUSYA, and the NFMA.'58
But when deciding whether the agencies acted in an arbitrary and
capricious manner, the courts must also look at the various interests
presented by several different groups.
While many people might view the different interest groups as
being opposed, in reality they are not. Few people would suggest that
the government should allow extensive timber removal from our
national forests.'59 While maintaining that the complete elimination of
timber harvesting from national forests would deprive many people of
their livelihood, most people in the timber industry acknowledge that
"I This group ofpeople would include not only employees of the lumber companies, but also
others in the communities, perhaps people who own small businesses whose existence depends on
patronage from others who work for the threatened lumber companies.
Including the counties of Casey, Russell, Adair, and Pulaski.
Telephone interview with Donald Tarter, owner of Tarter Gate Wood Products Co., which
includes a large sawmill, in Dunnville, Kentucky (Feb. 8, 1997).
156 Id.
"' Indeed, it seems utterly impossible for a logging company, no matter how careful and
responsible, to avoid causing at least some minor damage to national forests. The creation of
logging roads through the national forests will cause some damage to the environment in the forest
area, and no doubt some animals will be forced out of their habitat by the loggers. On this point,
one need only look to Mountain States Legal Found v. Glicknan, 92 F.3d. 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(danger to the grizzly bear); or to'Kentucky Heartwood, Inc. v. United States Forest Serv., (danger
to the Indiana bat) to see how some cases have directly addressed issues pertaining to the dangers
logging in the national forests imposes on some endangered species.
158 See supra, notes 5, 22, 24-6, and 28.
"5 Telephone interview with Donald Tarter, supra note 155.
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such timber harvesting must be controlled, and that this can be done
without causing irreparable harm to those individuals who depend on
it. 160 Alternatives always exist for people who lose their timber industry
jobs due to cutbacks in the harvesting of timber from national forests. 161
Loggers also can protect the forests when they remove timber. For
example, loggers should practice "selective cutting," which would allow
the harvesting of only certain trees, such as ones that are above a certain
size in diameter or ones that are dead or damaged. 62 Also, when cutting
trees, loggers can leave the treetops in the forest. The treetops will
serve to replenish the forest with new trees, which will begin growing
from the remains of the cut trees; whereas, if the treetops are removed
along with the rest of the timber, the area will remain barren for years. 163
Additionally, the Kentucky Forestry Association currently offers a
"Master Logging License," which is a certificate given to timber cutters
upon completing a two-day training course in safety and environmental
awareness when cutting timber."IM While this is currently an optional
training course for those in the timber industry, making it mandatory for
people who cut timber in national forests would serve to better protect
those national forests.
65
Courts must also pay special attention to the various wildlife
species which are affected by any agency decision rendered. Agencies
and courts should consider the effects of their decisions on all wildlife,
but especially those that are listed as endangered species. Equally as
important are the effects that a decision relating to timber harvesting in
a national forest would have on the environmental and aesthetic interests
of people in surrounding areas, as well as on people who use national
forests for recreation. Congress and the Supreme Court have already
recognized the legitimacy of these concerns.66
Normally, an Environmental Impact Statement will look at each of
these effects and determine the costs and benefits of any decision, 6 ' but
160 Id.
16' For example, they could go to work for the national forest, perhaps in a job that focuses
on preserving and protecting the nation's resources; or they could look elsewhere for timber for
their businesses, as there is plenty of timber in other areas. Id.
162 Id.
"' Interview with Josh Tarter, employee of Tarter Gate Wood Products Co., which includes
a large sawmill, in Dunnville, Kentucky. (Feb. 4, 1997).
64 Telephone interview with Donald Tarter, supra note 155.
165 Id.
' See, e.g., ESA, 16 U.S.C. §§ 153-15,44 (1994); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 562-63 (1992).
67 Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 F. 3d 1228, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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the courts should carefully consider the EIS along with any factors not
accounted for in the EIS. While the courts will allow broad discretion
by the Forest Service regarding the use of national forests, the courts
should also realize that these decisions, though supported by an EIS,
might disregard the interests of an injured party. While the court in
Mountain States Legal Foundation rested much of its decision on
whether the Forest Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously,16 other
courts should also look to other factors that may not have been




Applying the zone-of-interests test to a claim brought under the
ESA contravenes the intention of Congress to allow the broadest
standing requirements for citizen suits. When a court applies prudential
limits on standing in the ESA context, it disrupts the separation of
powers of the federal government. The Supreme Court has recognized
the authority of Congress to confer standing,170 and Congress exercised
this authority in the ESA by enacting the citizen suit provision. Placing
more limits on standing than required by the Constitution would
contravene congressional intent. Even if the zone-of-interests test did
apply to claims brought under the ESA, the test should not be applied
so narrowly as to bar all who do not have an interest in protected
endangered species. There is an economic policy underlying the ESA,
although it is obviously not the main purpose of the statute. By barring
a plaintiff with an economic interest, it would be possible that there
would be no "conceivable champion in the courts"'' for agency actions
that violate the ESA. Congress tried to avoid this problem by initially
enacting the citizen suit provision.
Once a plaintiff meets the standing requirements, agencies and
courts should consider the interests of every party in the decision-
making process. Various interests compete for the resources of our
68 Id. at 1238.
Specifically, the court spoke of lost jobs by the plaintiff lumber company when deciding
on the merits of the case. Dangers to some ofthe plaintiffs who hiked and camped in the forest and
dangers to those who lived near the forest, while considered when the court ruled on the standing
issues, were not looked at when the court dealt with the merits of the plaintiffs' claims. Id. at 1238.
"o See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
171 Id,
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national forests. Those interests must be balanced, and often co-exist
without controversy. When competition for limited resources leads to
lawsuits, then the courts have the undesirable task of deciding which
interests should prevail, and to what extent.

